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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout Europe, South America, and North America
there exist systems for extra-contractual reparations for per-
sonal physical injury or property damage caused by the sub-
standard conduct of others. The tort law of the United States,
and that of other common law countries, derived in a labored
but largely undistracted path from the common law of England.
In contrast, in continental Europe, Central America and South
America, the jurisprudence of such civil liability has developed
within the procedural matrix and the cultural expectations of
their respective civil codes.'
Many observers have quailed at the prospect of identifying
similarities between and among the diverse civil code treat-
ments of liability for "negligence," a concededly common law no-
menclature. Such observers often note that the civil code
maturation through the original Napoleonic Code and the
greatly influential adaptation of that code in Chilean law is sim-
ply too incongruous a presentation of cultural commitment to
justice for victims of unintentional injury to ever be reconciled
meaningfully with common law negligence.
An examination of the contemporary Colombian civil code
treatment of extra-contractual liability for harm (daflo) to per-
sons or property in fact reveals a system, similar in many re-
spects to the civil code regimens of other Latin American
nations, in which the similarities with the policies of common
law negligence actually dwarf the distinctions, or at least re-
duce most of the distinctions to formalisms.
This article will describe essential nature of the Anglo-
American development of the common law negligence compo-
nents of duty, breach, and damages. There follows a detailed
I Such civil codes find their rootstock in Roman law and the Napoleonic
Code. See Richard Azarnia, Tort Law in France: A Cultural and Comparative
Overview, 13 Wis. INT'L L.J. 471, 471 (1995).
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discussion of the origins of Colombian liability (responsibilidad)
for unintentional harms to persons or property (dafios). In the
course of the latter discussion, distinctions, variations and pol-
icy tangencies will be identified and discussed.
II. ANGLO-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAW OF NEGLIGENCE
A. Generally
The Anglo-American development of the doctrine of liabil-
ity for negligent acts causing harm to others or to their property
followed a lengthy legal devotion to liability without fault, or
strict liability.2 Some scholars have associated the perfection of
fault-based liability with the Industrial Revolution in England.
3
However, observers seem not to have established satisfactorily
whether negligence liability was a mechanism of legal benevo-
lence to persons and chattels or instead a legal prophylaxis that
reduced the potential liability of businesses by requiring the pu-
tative plaintiff to prove not only injury and causation, but also
that the actor had proceeded with an absence of due care under
the circumstances. 4
Modern negligence law is concerned primarily with the pro-
vision of reparations to persons suffering personal injury or
property loss due to a failure of others to act with due care
under the circumstances. It is established that (1) tort law is
devoted to the protection of persons and property from unrea-
sonable risk of harm; and (2) the actor's liability in tort is lim-
ited by concepts of reasonable foreseeability. Employing as an
example the law of products liability, it is possible to state a
rule for negligence liability for the sale of an unreasonably dan-
gerous product: A product seller is liable in negligence if he acts
2 See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS 259-63 (2000).
3 The development of negligence law "was probably stimulated a good deal by
the enormous increase of industrial machinery and by the invention of railways in
particular." P. WINFIELD, LAW OF TORT 404 (5th ed. 1950).
4 Compare WINFIELD, id. ("At that time railway trains were notable for
neither speed nor for safety. They killed any object from a Minister of State to a
wandering cow, and this naturally reacted upon the law.") with Robert J. Kazorow-
ski, The Common-Law Basis of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO S.L.J. 1
(1990) (referencing scholarly proponents of theory that negligence liability arose in
a court-stimulated effort to moderate the liability of businesses and to permit devo-
tion of industrial capital to production rather than to satisfaction of legal liability).
3
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or fails to act in such a way as to create an unreasonable risk of
harm or loss to the user of a product or to another who might
foreseeably be injured thereby, and such act or omission is the
legal cause of the claimant's harm.
More broadly, the contemporary United States cause of ac-
tion for negligence requires the plaintiff to prove that (1) the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant
breached that duty; (3) that the defendant's breach was the
cause in fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury or
loss; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered harm compensable in
tort. This segment of the article will be devoted only to a discus-
sion of Anglo-American legal treatment of the first two dimen-
sions of the plaintiffs cause of action in negligence: (1) duty;
and (2) breach, and (4) compensable damages. Two theoretical
models serve as a backdrop for consideration of modern Anglo-
American treatment of duty and breach in negligence law. Con-
siderations of corrective justice and economic efficiency each
contribute distinctive but largely harmonious analytical
threads.
B. Corrective Justice
In general terms, corrective justice proponents advance the
proposition that the judiciary should promote a rights-based ju-
risprudence grounded in moral precepts. 5 Even among those
observers who would not subscribe wholeheartedly to this pro-
position, there is probably a consensus that if moral precepts
are not to be the primary values supported, justice and moral-
ity-based goals still form a necessary if not sufficient founda-
tional element of modern tort law.6 The moral authority of any
5 See Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: Reflections on a
Theory of Contract, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 925, 925 n.1 (1987) (citing RONALD DWOR-
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 1-130 (rev. ed. 1977), in which Dworkin "pro-
pound[s] a rights-based theory of law and a corresponding obligation of judges to
consider moral precepts when deciding significant cases").
6 It is agreed generally that only a wrong can transgress a moral imperative,
in the sense that a harm befalling a plaintiff with no predicate negligence or viola-
tion of some other doctrinal imperative, such as liability for abnormally dangerous
activities, creates no rectificatory duty of any actor. Ernest Weinrib might point to
tort doctrine as common law in which wrongdoing is a necessary, but not individu-
ally adequate, component of liability. See Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and
Motive: A Descriptive Model of the Development of Tort Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REV.
1231, 1240 (1990) ("[Wlrongdoing of a party is an essential factor in the decision to
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law turns upon the perception that its tenets lead to just re-
sults. 7 There is widespread agreement that a core considera-
tion in any modern contemplation of "justice" would be the goal
of "corrective" justice, i.e., a result that to the extent possible
deprives the wrongful party of his gain, and restores the injured
party to the position he enjoyed before the harm.8 Holmes ex-
plained: "Be the exceptions more or less numerous, the general
purpose of the law of torts is to secure a man indemnity against
certain forms of harm to person, reputation, or estate, at the
hands of his neighbors . .. ."9
C. Economic Efficiency
Richard Posner and others call for a scientific ethic of
wealth maximization, a so-called "efficiency norm."10 Many
have responded to this call, with one influential commentator
concluding that "much (though by no means all) of modern tort
impose liability. . ." (citing Ernest J. Weinrib, The Morality of Tort Law, Address
to the Tort Law Section, Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting
(Jan. 9, 1988))).
7 See READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 37 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938) ("As Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb i.5), that which is not just seems to be no law at all: wherefore
the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice."); cf. Randy E. Barnett, Get-
ting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12
CONST. COMM. 93, 105-13 (1995) (arguing that for constitutional procedures to be
legitimate, they must be of such a nature as to bind in conscience).
8 Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53 (David Owen ed., 1995) ("[C]orrective justice is the
principle that those who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a
duty to repair them, and that the core of tort law embodies this conception of cor-
rective justice.").
9 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 115 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881) (emphasis added). In addition, Henry Sumner
Maine observed: "Now the penal Law of ancient communities is not the law of
Crimes; it is the law of Wrongs, or, to use the English technical word, of Torts. The
person injured proceeds against the wrong-doer by an ordinary civil action, and
recovers compensation in the shape of money-damages if he succeeds.... [All such
Torts] gave rise to an Obligation or vinculum juris, and were all requited by a
payment of money." HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH
THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS ITS RELATION
TO MODERN IDEAS 370 (1866).
10 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Effi-
ciency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
5
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law is at least roughly consistent with a Posnerian economic
analysis.""
Numerous analysts have identified a common law tropism
towards efficiency. 12 Importantly, scholars have also concluded
that efficient rules of law actually predict efficient litigation
strategies, including settlement strategies. As stated by
Ramona L. Paetzold and Steven L. Willborn, "[wihere both par-
ties to a dispute have a continuing interest in precedent, the
parties will settle if the existing precedent is efficient, but liti-
gate if the precedent is inefficient."' 3 Wes Parsons, even while
disputing these premises, collected scholarship revealing in fact
the broad range of cost internalization achievements of evolving
common law doctrine.' 4 Included in Parsons's review was
scholarly attribution to the common law of accidents as
"promot(ing) efficient resource allocation;"'15 the efficiencies of
the common law of rescue, salvage and Good Samaritan assis-
tance;' 6 the efficiency of the common law damages rule for an-
ticipatory repudiation of contract;' 7 and the efficiency of the
economic loss rule in tort.'8
A leading exponent of the efficiency role of the common law
of tort has been Dean, and now Judge, Guido Calabresi, who
argues persuasively that in matters of compensation for acci-
dents, civil liability should ordinarily be laid at the door of the
11 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 377, 381 (1994) [hereinafter G. Schwartz,
Deterrence].
12 E.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Effi-
cient Rules, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 65 (1977); Ramona L. Paetzold and Steven L. Willborn,
The Efficiency of the Common Law Reconsidered, 14 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 157
(1991)[Hereinafter Paetzold and Willborn].
13 Paetzold and Willborn, supra note 13.
14 Wes Parsons, Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983).
15 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 852 (1981).
16 William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Savors, Finders, Good Samaritans
and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 83,
128 (1977).
17 Thomas H. Jackson, 'Anticipatory Repudiation' and the Temporal Element
of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospec-
tive Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1978)("compensating the aggrieved
party for its entire expectation loss, without overcompensating it, is an economi-
cally sound principle in that it facilitates the movement of goods and services to
their higher value user." Id. at 69).
18 W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 1, 2-3 (1982).
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"cheapest cost avoider," the actor who could most easily discover
and inexpensively remediate the hazard. Together with A.
Douglas Melamed, Calebresi states that, particularly in the set-
ting of environmental harm, considerations of economic effi-
ciency dictate placing the cost of accidents "on the party or
activity which can most cheaply avoid them[.]" 19 A lucid adop-
tion of this approach is found in the Ninth Circuit decision of
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,20 a California coastal oil spill case in
which the court allowed commercial fishermen to recover from
defendant their business losses caused by lost fishing opportu-
nity during a period of pollution. Noting some difficulties in ap-
plying the "best or cheapest cost avoider" approach in concrete
circumstances, the court followed Calabresi's requirement that
it "exclude as potential cost avoiders those groups\ activities
which could avoid accident costs only at extremely high ex-
pense."21 This approach, to the mind of the appeals court, mili-
tated against the conclusion that the cost of preventing or
repositioning the loss should be borne directly by consumers
(fishermen or seafood purchasers) in the form of precautionary
measures (whatever they might hypothetically be), or by first
party insurance. Rather, the court found, justice and efficiency
were served by placing responsibility for the loss on the "best
cost avoider," in this setting the defendant oil company. The
court explained its reasoning:
[T]he loss should be borne by the party who can best correct any
error in allocation, if such there be, by acquiring the activity to
which the party has been made liable. The capacity to "buy out"
the plaintiffs if the burden is too great is, in essence, the real focus
of Calabresi's approach. On this basis, there is no contest - the
defendant's capacity is superior.2 2
19 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972). See also MARK C.
RUDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY AND TORT 29, 32-33
(Temple 1995).
20 Union Oil Co. v. Open, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
21 Id. at 569.
22 Id. at 569-570.
7
PACE INT'L L. REV. [Vol. 13:59
III. DUTY
When it is claimed that an actor owed a duty to a plaintiff,
the duty described is that of ordinary care, or care commensu-
rate with that which would be expected of a reasonable man
under the same or similar circumstances. The duty is not owed
to a public generally, but rather to those whom the actor, look-
ing prospectively with the eye of reasonable vigilance, would
perceive to be put at an unreasonable risk of harm or loss
should the actor proceed incautiously, or with an absence of due
care.23 The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Brown v. Kendall24 put the proposition in these influ-
ential words: "[W]hat constitutes ordinary care will vary with
the circumstances .... In general it means that kind and de-
gree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use, such
as is required by the exigency of the case."25
Duty is relational, which is to say that for a duty to exist, it
must be associated with a particular person or a particular class
of person within which the plaintiff finds himself.26 Thus as it
23 The proposition .... is that whenever one person is by circumstances
placed in such a positionwith regard to another that every one of ordinary
sense ... would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and
skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances, he would
cause danger of injury to the person or property of another, a duty arises
to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.
Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (C.A. 1883) (Brett, M.R.).
24 Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850).
25 Id. at 296.
26 The element of duty establishes that there is a legally recognized rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the defendant and the plaintiff that
obligates the defendant to act (or refrain from acting) in a certain manner
toward the plaintiff .... Whether a duty exists is largely a policy-based
determination. [Where the presence or absence of duty constitutes an is-
sue to be decided by the court, "a judge often balances such factors as the
forseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the connections between the de-
fendant's conduct and the injury suffered; the policy of preventing future
harm; the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the commu-
nity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach;
and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved."
JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE R. LEVINE, M. STUART MADDEN, UNDERSTANDING
TORTS 112 (1996).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol13/iss1/2
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has been said that negligence "air" does not exist,27 and neither
does its predicate, duty. Returning to the model of products lia-
bility law, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 28 secured its position
as a lynchpin in the development of products liability by provid-
ing persuasive arguments as to three propositions governing
the duty of manufacturers. The opinion of Judge Cardozo is
greatly informative in its evaluation of duty as affected by the
variability of risk, the foreseeability of that risk should the ac-
tor proceed without due care, and the identification of the class
of persons to whom duty is owed. The three propositions were
these: (1) a manufacturer owes a duty of due care to not only its
immediate vendee, but also to remote vendees who in the ordi-
nary course may be expected to purchase the product; (2) the
duty is not confined to the manufacture and sale of so called
imminently dangerous products, but instead to all products that
could be expected to do substantial harm to others if not made
with care appropriate to the pertinent risks; and (3) this duty of
due care is nondelegable, and thus even if it is a component part
of the product that causes its injurious failure, the manufac-
turer of the overall product may remain liable.
MacPherson stood for the principle that although manufac-
turers of all products would be held to a standard of ordinary
care under the circumstances, the ordinary care expected of a
manufacturer of locomotives would logically involve a higher
level of scrutiny than would the "ordinary care" that one might
expect of a the weaver of fruit baskets, as the risk of harm from
a negligently manufactured locomotive is incalculably greater
than that created by a defectively fashioned basket. Each of the
rules advanced in MacPherson: (1) the injured plaintiffs negli-
gence remedy against the remote manufacturer without regard
to privity; (2) the finished product seller's responsibility (or
duty) for the prudent design and the manufacturing integrity of
component parts; and (3) the manufacturer's duty to conduct
reasonable and necessary tests on the product before its intro-
duction into commerce, represents the established majority rule
in tort today.
27 See Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 471 A.2d 25, (1984),
quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1971)(while facts may indi-
cate negligence in the air, "it is still necessary to bring it home to the defendant.").
28 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
9
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Further illustrative of modern interpretation of duty in tort
law is the New York decision in DiPonzio v. Riordan.29 That
suit involved injuries sustained by a filling station patron when
another customer's car, left running as the latter paid his bill
inside, slipped either into gear or into neutral and backed into
plaintiff, injuring his leg. Plaintiff and his wife sued the car
owner and the filling station. As to the filling station, plaintiffs'
theory was that it "had been negligent in failing to properly
train its attendants and that its attendants had been negligent
in failing to comply with [station's] rules requiring that custom-
ers be warned to turn off their engines while fueling their
vehicles.,,30
The Supreme Court denied defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, in which defendant argued "the lack of any cog-
nizable duty, the lack of a proximate causal relationship
between its alleged negligence, if any, and the accident, and the
unforeseeability of the accident."3 1 The Appellate Division
reversed.
The New York Court of Appeals identified the "threshold"
inquiry as being "whether [the station] had a legally cognizable
duty" to take measures to prevent this accident. Acknowledg-
ing that a business proprietor's duty extends to "maintain[ing]
their property in a reasonably safe condition[,]" and that the
duty "may extend to controlling the conduct of third persons
who frequent or use the property, at least under some circum-
stances[,]" the court observed that these duties are "not limit-
less. '32 Drawing upon the Palsgraf. v. Long Island R.R., the
Court reiterated that "[tihe risk reasonably to be perceived de-
fines the duty to be obeyed."33 Applying this standard, the
Court of Appeals concluded there could be no service station lia-
bility, as "DiPonzio's injuries did not arise from the occurrence
of any of the hazards that the duty would exist to prevent." The
Court's reasoning continued: "When a vehicle's engine is left
running in an area where gasoline is being pumped, there is a
29 DiPonzio v. Riordan, 89 N.Y.2d 578, 679 N.E.2d 616, 657 N.Y.S.2d 377
(1997).
30 Id. at 581-82.
31 Id. at 582.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 583 (citing Palsgrafv. Long Is. R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E.
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natural and foreseeable risk of fire or explosion because of the
highly flammable properties of the fuel .... It is this class of
foreseeable hazards that defines the scope of [the] station's pur-
ported duty. The occurrence that led to plaintiffs injury was
clearly outside of this limited class of hazards."
Further illustrative of the boundaries that will be imposed
upon an actor's duty is one decision requiring the court's consid-
eration of whether a manufacturer's duty, and potential liabil-
ity, in a DES case should be extended to the generation born not
of the mother who ingested the DES, but rather to the second
generation, which is to say, the offspring of the DES daughter.
The Ohio Supreme Court offered a telling treatment of the logi-
cal limits of an actor's duty in Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co.,34 follow-
ing a federal trial court certified this issue to the Ohio Supreme
Court in the setting of a grandchild's claim, through his repre-
sentatives, that his severe birth defects were caused by defects
in the mother's reproductive system, which defects were earlier
caused by the grandmother's ingestion of the drug DES. The
court noted that courts in some other jurisdictions, on similar
but distinguishable facts, had not permitted actions to proceed
for such "preconception" torts.35 The Ohio high court noted Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island RR. Co.36 for the proposition that "[an ac-
tor does not have a duty to a particular plaintiff unless the risk
to that plaintiff is within the actor's 'range of apprehension."'
37
Finding no cause of action inuring to the grandchild, the Grover
court explained:
When a pharmaceutical company prescribes drugs to a woman,
the company, under ordinary circumstances, does not have a duty
to her daughter's infant who will be conceived twenty-eight years
later. Because of remoteness in time and causation, we hold that;
the grandchild] does not have an independent cause of action, and
answer the district court's question in the negative. A pharma-
34 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992).
35 The court noted Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989)(cause of action against mother's physicians for failure to inoculate mother
with rubella vaccine prior to child's conception) and Renslow v. Mennonite Hospi-
tal, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Il. 1977) (negligence action by child against hospital that
negligently gave mother Rh-positive blood eight years before, stimulating Rh-posi-
tive antibodies that injured the fetus).
36 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
37 591 N.E.2d 696, quoting Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
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ceutical company's liability for the distribution or manufacturer of
a defective prescription drug does not extend to persons who were
never exposed to the drug, either directly or in utero.38
IV. BREACH OF DUTY
To locate the line between an actor's fulfillment of its duty
to others and its breach of that duty, courts in numerous juris-
dictions employ the formulation of Judge Learned Hand, or a
harmonious risk-benefit model. 39 This primitive but enor-
mously influential calculus was offered in a negligence context
by Judge Learned Hand in the opinions in United States v. Car-
roll Towing Co.,40 and Conway v. O'Brien.41 In those two cases,
the court stated that "the degree of care appropriate to a situa-
tion is the result of the calculus using three factors: the likeli-
hood that the conduct will injure others, multiplied by the
seriousness of the risk if it happens, balanced against the bur-
den of taking precautions against the risk."42 The formula is
known to many as B (Burden) < P (Probability of Harm) * L
(Magnitude of Loss Should It Occur).43 The Learned Hand ap-
proach can be conformed to more modern utilitarian analysis by
visualizing B as encompassing not only the particular burden of
precautionary measures upon the actor, but also the burden
upon society if the conduct must either be eliminated due to lia-
bility rules, or made more expensive by requiring precautionary
measure and therefore beyond the economic reach of many.44
38 Id. at 700-01.
39 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.1947).
40 159 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
41 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
42 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d) § 4.2 at 108 (1988).
43 Of Hand's formula, Posner writes:
This is an economic test. The burden of precautions is the cost of avoiding
the accident. The loss multiplied by the probability of the accident is the
expected accident cost, i.e., the cost that the precautions would have
averted. If a larger cost could have been avoided by incurring a smaller
cost, efficiency requires that the smaller cost be incurred.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 122 (2d ed. 1977) (citations
omitted).
44 Likewise in keeping with a utilitarian view that transcends the concerns of
the individual plaintiff and defendant, consideration of the factors P (Probability of
Harm) and the L (Magnitude of the Loss should it occur) would be enlarged to
contemplate the likelihood of harm to others identically or similarly situated, and
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Applying this negligence evaluation to a hypothetical per-
sonal injury claim arising from a vehicular collision in which
the plaintiffs injuries were caused by this design defect in the
automobile: a rear positioned gas tank particularly susceptible
to rupture, creating the risk of conflagration in a collision.
These facts would support a finding of manufacturer negligence
if one agrees that on the right side of the equation there is a
measurable risk that any motor vehicle will be struck from the
rear at some time during its useful life, and if one agrees fur-
ther that the type of injury that might follow from the rupture
of a gas tank in a collision is very great indeed. Turning to the
left side of the equation, suppose the financial burden to the
manufacturer of either using a more sturdy material for the
tank, or placing the tank in a more forward position beneath the
vehicle, was only a matter of $200 per car. The claimant would
argue that such a cost is certainly moderate, and is, in any
event, less than the risk of some harm multiplied by the seri-
ousness of that harm (death or serious bodily harm) should the
design change not be undertaken. If the assumptions in this
hypothetical are accepted, a plaintiff injured in this way should
be able to make out a prima facie case that the manufacturer
has breached its duty of care.
V. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
A. Generally
Compensatory damages are those damages awardable to a
person as compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harm or
loss caused by the tortious act of another.45 One principal goal
of compensatory damages is to place the person in the position
they were in before the injury or loss, at least insofar as money
damages can do so, which is to say compensatory damages "are
designed to place [the injured party] in a position substantially
equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would have been
in had no tort been committed."46 A second goal is that of deter-
ring similar tortious conduct in the future, be it undertaken by
the magnitude of the potential harm, not only in terms of the individual plaintiff
but also to the population exposed to the risk.
45 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 903.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt.
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the defendant or by others. 47 Restatement Second, Torts § 901
summarizes the purposes of tort damages as: "to give compen-
sation, indemnity, and restitution for harms *** to determine
rights *** to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct ***
and to vindicate parties and deter retaliation of violent and un-
lawful self-help."48
A claimant's non-economic harm is ordinarily distinguished
from his economic harm. Often also termed pecuniary loss, eco-
nomic loss includes such loss as to which a monetary value can
be assigned with some level of experience-based reliability. Ex-
amples of economic harm would be past and future lost wages,
or the cost of past and anticipated medical care, physical reha-
bilitation and the like. Non-economic damages are less suscep-
tible of reliable monetary valuation. Such non-economic
damages can include, without limitation, indemnity for a claim-
ant's pain and suffering, emotional distress, a spouse's loss of
consortium, and lost quality of life-the latter often referred to
as hedonic damages. An endorsement of this evaluation is
found in the Analysis to the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act which suggests that awards for pain and suffering "have no
market value and, thus, are to be contrasted with pecuniary
damages which compensate victims for lost wages, medical and
rehabilitation costs, and other actual expenditures has or will
incur due to injuries caused by a defective product."49
B. Personal Physical Injury
All jurisdictions permit the personal injury plaintiff recov-
ery for pain and suffering. 50 Restatement Second, Torts § 924
confirms that the prevailing plaintiff may recover damages for
past or prospective "bodily harm and emotional distress[;] ***
loss or impairment of earning capacity[;] *** reasonable medical
47 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASE AND MATERIALS ON TORTS §§ 4.4-.7
(6th ed. 1995).
48 Id. at § 17.2 ("[The bywords in establishing the law of damages are com-
pensation, deterrence, and consistency.").
49 Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 118(D) (Analysis), 44 Fed.Reg.
62746 (Oct. 31, 1979).
50 EPSTEIN supra note 47, at § 17.2 ("All jurisdictions recognize a right to re-
cover damages for bodily injuries, generally defined to cover 'any impairment of
the physical condition, including illness and physical pain."'), quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. b. E.g., Lakin v. Senco Products, 329 Or. 62
(Or. 1999).
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and other expenses; and *** harm to property and business
caused by the invasion."51 Thus, it is agreed generally that the
successful plaintiff in a tort personal injury claim can recover
provable damage to property, for personal injury, illness, or
death, or for mental or emotional harm accompanying plaintiffs
placement in direct physical peril by such a the defendant's ac-
tions.52 Plaintiffs personal injury damages are recognized gen-
erally to include "medical expenses, loss of future earnings,
permanent disability or disfigurement, and damages for past
and future mental pain and suffering."53 The general rule is
that the injured plaintiff may be awarded compensatory dam-
ages without proof of pecuniary loss.
54
For personal physical injuries involving a reduction or
elimination of the plaintiffs ability to earn a livelihood, the
claimant may recover damages for loss of future earnings. Such
injuries are recoverable in tort, because, as they are associated
with personal injury, they are not precluded by application of
the rule ordinarily applied to "pure economic loss." 55 Accord-
ingly, in determining the size of such an award, it is agreed gen-
erally that the finder of fact may consider plaintiffs loss of
earning ability, loss of future earning capacity, work life expec-
tancy, age, life expectancy, investment income, inflation, pre-
dictable productivity increase, prospects for rehabilitation, and
probable future earning capacity.5
6
C. Increased Risk of Future Illness
In some jurisdictions a plaintiff whose exposure to a pro-
cess, often a process that contaminates the environment, ele-
vates his risk of contracting an injury or disease in the future
51 See generally Thomas W. Long, Economic Impairment in Personal Injury
Actions, 30 So.TEx.L.REv. 97 1989); Steven G. Schumaier, Proof of Hearing Loss,
22 TRAL 32 (1986).
52 See N.J.Rev.Stat. § 1(1), Ch. 197.
53 E.g., Adkins v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 18 F.3d 1349 (6th Cir.1994) (asbestos-
related personal injury action).
54 See, e.g., Croteau v. Olin Corp., 644 F.Supp. 208 (D.N.H.1986).
55 The "economic loss" rule provides generally that economic loss that is not
associated with personal physical injury or damage to property cannot be recover-
able in tort. Rather, such "pure" economic loss claims may only be pursued in
warranty or other contract claims.
56 E.g., Lanclos v. Rockwell International Corp., 470 So.2d 924, 934(La. Ct.
App.1985); Robertson v. Superior PMI, Inc., 791 F.2d 402 (5th Cir.1986).
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may seek a monetary award for incurring the increased risk.
Where a claimant can show existing illness or disease that is
understood by sound medical science to be a precursor of the
future injury or disease feared, many jurisdictions will permit
recovery in damages for the increased risk of that future
disease.57
D. Emotional Distress
Subject to application of state by state standards, courts in
all jurisdictions permit the award of damages for emotional dis-
tress associated with plaintiffs personal injury.58 Such recov-
ery may be secured under any of the conventional doctrines
under which the finder of fact determines an award to be allow-
able, be it negligence, warranty, or strict tort liability.
E. Fear of Future Illness
Distinct questions of recoverability and proof are posed by
the emotional distress claims of the plaintiff who is "at risk" of
illness due to antecedent exposure to a long latency disease-in-
ducing substance due to another's claimed negligence. The is-
sue posed is how, if at all, may the person exposed to, for
example, respirable asbestos, or a contaminated water source,
or whose mother was prescribed a synthetic estrogen during
pregnancy, articulate a claim for damages for the reasonable
apprehension of future illness. A claim for increased risk of fu-
ture disease differs from a claim for fear of such future illness.
The former is based solely upon the probability upon the medi-
cal probability of the future illness, and in this sense permits
recovery to the plaintiff who has involuntarily been denied a
future without an unreasonable risk of harm from defendant's
product or process. The latter claim, for reasonable fear or ap-
prehension of the manifestation of a future illness, represents a
claim for emotional distress damages.
F. Property Damage
In tort suits, including negligence actions, compensatory
damages will be considered appropriate for plaintiffs injury or
57 E.g., Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. Super. 1993).
58 See comment to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.
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loss due to harm to his property, or to the loss or diminution of
individual or business earning capacity, but only upon proof of
the actual pecuniary loss. 59 In a products liability claim, to use
one model, physical damage the defective product causes to the
user's other property should be compensable in a cause of action
brought either in negligence or in strict liability, or as conse-
quential damages in warranty.
60
The ordinary measurement for tortious damage to property
is the calculation of the value of the property immediately pre-
ceding the loss, less the value following the loss, plus appropri-
ate compensation for plaintiffs deprivation of the property or
loss of use. 61 When the loss to plaintiffs property amounts to
total destruction, plaintiff will be entitled to damages measured
by the difference between the value of the property before the
loss and after the harm, or the reasonable cost of repair or res-
toration, and the loss of use.62
VI. COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE
A. Generally
As is the case for most Latin American countries, Colom-
bia's jurisprudence is based largely upon its civil code; thus, its
approach to tort law liability differs from common law coun-
tries, such as the United States. 63 Unlike Anglo-American ju-
risprudence, which uses case law as primary authority in the
development of its legal principles, such as the doctrine negli-
gence, Colombian jurisprudence does not follow precedent as a
primary authority of its laws. Cases are decided based on the
particular facts of the case at hand, and the court's ruling is not
binding on future decisions even if the facts of the later case
mirror that of the prior case.
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906: "Damages for causing a loss of
earning capacity are not necessarily based upon what the plaintiff has done or
would have done, but are based upon the amount by which the earning capacity of
the plaintiff has been reduced through the conduct of the tortfeasor."
60 See, e.g., Z-J Corp. v Tice, 126 F.3d 539 (3rd Cir. 1997) (allowing recovery in
negligence and strict liability for "other" property).
61 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 927(a), (b), (c).
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 928.
63 M.C. Mirow, The Power of Codification in Latin America: Simon Bolivar
and the Code Napoleon, TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L., 83, 83 (2000).
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This analysis of the Colombian notion of negligence is
based on four primary texts written by Colombian legal schol-
ars. They all agree that in its basic form, the term liability sug-
gests a link between individuals.64 It is a term that suggests a
nexus between two people- he who causes the harm and he
who suffers it. The term liability is used to describe the duty to
assume the consequences of an act, an occurrence or a form of
conduct.6 5
Non-contractual duty arises when a person wrongs or
harms another or its belongings. This form of liability arises
where there is no contractual nexus between the two. Non-con-
tractual civil liability is divided into direct or personal liability
and indirect or complex liability. Indirect liability refers to vi-
carious liability or acts made with the aid of machines that are
used in dangerous activities. These forms of liability are codi-
fied in the Colombian Civil Code. Personal liability is stated in
Article 2341, third party liability is stated in Article 2347, lia-
bility due to the acts of an animal is stated in Article 2353, lia-
bility arising out of the use of machines is stated in Articles
2350 and 2355, and liability arising out of dangerous activities
is stated in Article 2356.66
The Colombian legislature maintains a division in the
treatment of contractual versus non-contractual liability. This
differential treatment is shown in the separate codification of
these two forms of liability in the Colombian Civil Code.
B. The Unicistas v. The Dualistas
There are two theories of liability among Colombian schol-
ars. The first theory is the Unicista (unity) theory.67 This the-
ory reinforces that both types of liability come from a breach of
duty or obligation (responsabilidad). The fact that one arises
out of a contractual obligation and the other does not should not
be a factor in determining liability.68 The second theory is the
64 See HUMBERTO CUELLAR GUTIERREZ, RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACON.
TRACTUAL (1983); JUAN CARLOS HENAO, EL D~fqo; GILBERTO MARTINEZ RAVE, RE-
SPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EXTRACONTRACTUAL (10th ed. 1998); JAVIER TAMAYO
JARAMILLO, 2 DE LA RESPONSIBILIDAD CIVIL (1989).
65 See MARTINEZ RAVE, supra note 64, at 3.
66 See MARTINEZ RAVE, supra note 64, at 1-50.
67 See id. at 17.
68 See id.
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Dualista (dual) theory. This is the conventional Colombian the-
ory. It seeks to treat liability in terms of the obligations as-
sumed either by contract or by law in two separate categories.
69
Irrespective of the theory adopted, in either situation the
act that causes the harm or injury does not have to be an illicit
act. The trigger to liability lies in the modification or alteration
of the previous state of a thing or person. In contractual liabil-
ity there are different levels of breach. There is only one level
for breach non-contractual liability. "Culpa" which translates
into fault, is also used when referring to civil liability. Culpa
must be proved under Civil code Article 2341 but it is presumed
under Articles 2347, 2350, 2353, 2355, and 2356.
70
The study and development of non-contractual liability in
Colombia in the modern times has also looked at risks (riesgos)
when identifying the elements of liability. In the past, Colom-
bian law had a subjective approach towards the elements neces-
sary to establish liability. In the study of non-contractual
liability there are two interests at stake: the progress of tech-
nology and the welfare of the public in general from the use or
misuse of this technology. In this quest, Martinez questions the
Colombian legal system's ability to handle these interests and
still uphold the rights of the injured.71
C. Impact of Science and Technology in Colombian
Jurisprudence: Jaramillos' Approach
Jaramillo states that the scientific and technological ad-
vances of the past few decades have obligated and permitted
that the laws regarding liability for negligent acts undergo a
radical change. The scholar posits that most of the principles
guiding negligence liability of fifty years ago are not applicable
today. In effect, transportation in general and objects used in
everyday life have made it almost impossible for the victim to be
able to demonstrate the fault (culpa) by the responsible party. 72
Based on this proposition, Colombian jurisprudence has at-
tempted to mitigate this problem, for example, in cases of dan-
gerous activities, the victim only has to show that the
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See T mvyo JARAMILLO, supra note 64, at 1.
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occurrence caused by the defendant was the triggering factor of
his injuries and harm. Legislators have tried to free the victim
from the procedural burdens of proof that bring the element of
fault into the equation for sustaining a negligence liability
claim. 73 Social Utility theory is also present in Colombian law
as it accepts the harms posed by technology (tecnologa mean-
ing man-made structures, products, or mechanical fixtures)
upon the individual in order to improve society as a whole.
D. Duty
Chile's Civil Code, written by Andres Bellos, served as
guide to Colombia's Civil Code. 74 Both codes followed the
French model regarding non-contractual liability, the Napole-
onic Code.7 5 Both codes, however, left out the following words,
which were present in the Napoleonic Code, Article 1384 "we
are responsible (liable) of the things that we have under our
care (custody)." These few words have had a great impact in the
development of Colombian law. Without these words the victim
was left with the burden of proving fault or breach when deal-
ing with other than direct or personal negligence cases.76
Through the use of technology and scientific development,
the role and importance of direct liability as stated in Article
2341 of the Colombian Civil Code has decreased. As potential
liability arising out of dangerous activities increases, the inter-
pretation and application of Article 2356 is also elevated. A vic-
tim of a civil non-contractual wrongdoing fares best if he can
establish that his harm and injuries arose out of defendant's
engagement in a dangerous activity defined by Article 2356. If
the claimant is successful in establishing the claim, the liabil-
ity, or breach of due care is presumed by law. This is an impor-
tant advantage for the victim who now does not have to prove
defendant's fault or guilt.77
According to Tamayo Jaramillo, the words left out from the
Napoleonic Code, Article 1383 "one is responsible (liable) for the
things that we have under our care (custody)," while not stated
73 See generally id. at ch. 2.
74 See Mirow, supra note 63, at 83.
75 See id. at 83-4.
76 See TAMAyo JARAMILLO, supra note 64, at 2.
77 See id. at 8-9.
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expressly in the Article, are given implicit effect in another arti-
cle of the Colombian Civil Code Article 669. Thus, arguably, it
operates as a means of avoiding the issue of, the predicate
showing of which predominated, in the early stages of Colom-
bian jurisprudence. Article 669 of the Civil Code defines the
word dominion as follows: "dominion [that is also called prop-
erty] is the right to a corporal [material] thing, to enjoy and dis-
pose of arbitrarily, as long as it is not against the law or against
the rights of others." These words allow for the interpretation
that intruding upon the rights of others does not require the
element of fault, thereby negating the proposition that it is
needed in non-contractual liability.78
VII. DANGEROUS ACTMTIES
It 1938 Colombia was introduced to the theory of civil lia-
bility for dangerous activities, which today is codified by Article
2356 and translated below. By dangerous activities (ac-
tividades peligrosas) is meant human pursuits that crate a high
and unavoidable risk of great harm. Up to 1938, Colombian
courts hewed to the principle of fault, which is present in the
French legal system. The historical development of this theory
arises out of the work of a lawyer by the name of Eduardo
Zuleta, who through his arguments in front of the Supreme
Court was able to introduce this theory to the Colombian juris-
prudence. Later, Carlos Ducci Claro, in his doctorate thesis
published in 1936, invoked the teachings of Zuleta, and further
developed this theory.79
Article 2356 presumes the liability of the defendant. He
can only be exonerated by a break in the causation link, such as
an act of force majeure. There were many debates among Co-
lombian scholars as to whether the use of the risk theory should
play a role in this type of liability, or whether the principle
should be that of objectivism. Whether the risk theory or the
objective theory is applied, one thing remains consistent: the
person engaging in the dangerous activity bears the burden of
exonerating himself from liability.80
78 See id. at 40-41.
79 See id. at 52-53.
80 See id. at 53-54.
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The test of Article 2356 demands that there be malice or
negligence on the part of the responsible party. This require-
ment is founded on the notion of fault. The fact that fault is
presumed or proved is a matter of legal interpretation. One
thing is certain, according to Tamayo Jaramillo, to wit, the risk
theory is adoptive in nature and does not have its roots in the
Colombian jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has debated
over the elements needed to point down the responsible party to
a dangerous activity. The modern trend is to hold he who has
the "intellectual direction and control over the dangerous
activity."s1
A. Civil Code Article 2356
The translation to this Article is as follows:
Article 2356 Obligations arising out of dangerous activities. As a
general rule all harm resulting from the malice of negligence of
another person must be compensated by the obligator.
Particularly obligated to reparation are:
1) He who imprudently fires a firearm;
2) He that removes things from a pipe or sewer line, or leaves
them open in a street or highway, without the precautions
needed to prevent the injury (falling) of its transients either
day or night;
3) He who does construction or reparations to aqueducts or foun-
tains that cross roads, has it in a state that could cause harm
to those traveling the roads.8 2
The Article further states that there is a presumption of guilt on
those who engage in dangerous activities. This is due to the
81 Id. at 60.
82 Art. 2356: Responsabilidad por actividades peligrosas. Por regla general
todo dafho que se pueda imputarse a malicia o negligencia de otra personon, debe
ser reprado por esta.
Son especialmente obligados a esta reparacion:
1) El que dispara imprudentemente un arma de fuego;
2) El que remueve las cosas de una acequia o caneria, o las descubre
en calle o en camino, sin las precauciones necesarias para que no
caigan los que por alli transiten de dia o de noche;
El que obligado a la construccion or reparacio de un acueducto o
fuente, que atraviesa un camino, lo tiene en estado de causar daflo a los
que transitan por el camino.
COLOMBIAN CIVIL CODE, Art. 2356.
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consideration that it is not the victim but the defendant who
creates the danger to third parties by engaging in an activity,
which although licit, in its nature implicates risks of such a na-
ture that the imminent occurrence of harm explains and vali-
dates this presumption.8 3
B. Automobile Accidents
Automobile accidents have constituted one of the most
abundant sources of Colombian personal injury litigation.
Humberto Cuellar Gutierrez summarizes different forms of ac-
cidents, which contain a negligent act. Some of these examples
include, running a red light and speeding. Both of these situa-
tions contain both a criminal act and a civil wrongdoing. The
modern doctrine, Gutierrez states, finds that there is only one
difference between the criminal and civil wrongdoing, that of
degree and not of the nature of the wrongdoing itself. As above-
mentioned, Article 2356 of the Civil Code defines what Colom-
bian law refers to as dangerous activities. To drive an
automobile is considered a form of dangerous activity.8 4
The elements for negligence for this type of activity are as
follows: First, there must be an accident. Second, the accident
must be occasioned by the dangerous activity. Third, the victim
is not obligated to demonstrate the culpability of the author of
the injurious act. Fourth, the person liable must be responsible
for the dangerous activity. Lastly, the accident cannot be the
result of force majeure, fault of a third party, or the fault of the
victim.8 5
Savatier defines an accident as the "abnormal fact and un-
foreseeable that has been produced thus bringing with it the
injury." Cuellar Gutierrez states that he would complete the
concept by adding the words "as a result of a dangerous activ-
ity." This addition to the definition allows people to make the
first distinction: the responsibility or liability defined in Article
2356, refers to injuries caused by automobiles, and is not appli-
cable when the injury does not come from the accident itself.
Injuries must be caused by the exercise of the dangerous activ-
ity and thus liability and duty of care arise from the same activ-
83 See id.
84 See HUMBERTO CUELLAR GUTIERREZ, supra note 64, at ch. 15.
85 See id.
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ity, not of fault, thus it is not necessary to prove non-contractual
liability. 6
In many instances, where there is an accident in land
transportation, the obligation or liability will be contractual in
kind. If a passenger is injured, the legal claim is made pursu-
ant to the Code of Commerce, in particular, Articles 982, 992
and 1003. If the passenger dies before exercising his rights, his
family will be allowed to commence a contractual hereditary
claim (hereditaria contractual). The death of the passenger also
allows his family to maintain a personal non-contractual negli-
gence claim. This action is based upon the injury they suffered
in relationship to the death of their family member, i.e., lost
earnings (lucro cesante). If a transporter causes injuries to a
pedestrian, however, his liability will be non-contractual and
will be applied under Article 2356.87
VIII. BREACH
For an occurrence or act to give rise to civil liability, the act
or occurrence (hecho) does not have to be illicit in nature or un-
lawful (delictivo) or intentional. Traditionally, the act that gave
rise to fault needed to be unlawful. Today the law divides these
acts into delictivo and cuasidelictivo. Acts, which are consid-
ered cuasidelictivo, are those that occur due to a mistake in con-
duct, which in turn, result in injury, or results that were not
sought after. Martinez disagrees with the traditional use of the
word delito (crime) when referring to civil liability. In his view,
the word delito should only be used in the context for which it
was created, criminal law. 8
There is considerable debate among Colombian scholars as
to whether fault should be part of the equation for civil liability.
The word fault or guilt translated into Spanish is culpa. The
same word is used in describing tortious conduct and criminal
conduct. The word culpa was used because there is no uniform
definition to describe breach of duty.8 9 To some Colombian
Scholars the term culpa imports not only fault or guilt, but also
breach. Pursuant to such an interpretation, the breach must
86 See generally MARTINEZ RAvE, supra note 64.
87 See generally TAMAYo JARAMILLO, supra note 64.
88 See MARTINEZ RAvE, supra note 64, at ch. 7.
89 See id. at ch. 10.
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have an objective factor that refers to awareness or free will of
the actor. To this date, however, culpa is based on a subjective
standard. It looks at the internal conditions surrounding the
breach of each individual. Martinez's text refers to some of
these objectivists scholars' definition of the word breach. Sera-
tier defined breach as the breach of a duty that the actor was
aware existed and could not observe. The Mazeud brothers de-
fined breach as a mistake of conduct that a prudent person
under similar circumstances would not make. The aforemen-
tioned theorists believe that we should look at breach in the ab-
stract light, which they call objective fault. Objective fault
looks at the prudent man as its model, the careful man, a "good
family man." Martinez cautions that this term should not be
confused with "objective liability" or strict liability, which does
not require the element of fault or breach.90
The objective fault approach is the modern view of liability
embraced by Colombian scholars. Notwithstanding this newest
view, the Colombian legal system is still based on subjective
fault. The subjective fault has criminal liability as its roots.
Despite the Colombian attempt to modify its notion to civil lia-
bility, Martinez believes that the principle and the required
showing of subjective fault will die out. To him, objective fault
is the next step in the progress and development of civil
liability.
Within the objective fault movement, there are many de-
bates regarding the management of fault. To some, the element
of culpa should be eliminated altogether. To others, liability
will be proven if the hecho or negligent occurrence is proven to-
gether with the injury. Martinez believes that an adequate in-
terpretation for Colombia would be to treat breach as presumed
in all cases where the other elements are proven by the injured.
In this case, the defendant can escape liability if he can demon-
strate that he acted with diligence and due care. In other cases,
which are expressly stated in the Civil Code Article 2356, for
example, liability should be presumed. The defendant in this
situation can escape liability by establishing a break in the cau-
sation link. Unlike the American origin of negligence, Colom-
bian negligence principles emerged with the question of "fault"
90 See id.
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as the first element of the negligence claim. This is of course,
an imitation of the Napoleonic Code's treatment of "fault."91
IX. INJURY: As THE FIRST ELEMENT OF LIABILITY
Non-contractual liability in Colombian law has as its goal
to deal with the issue of injuries or harm suffered by an individ-
ual in a legal and ordered fashion. The incorporation of this
notion into the law allows for society to develop rules regarding
human risk and the consequences of acts that arise out of the
risks.92 There is no consensus among Colombian scholars as to
which element of liability to highlight in the study of non-con-
tractual liability. The Colombian author Juan Carlos Henao
states that in dealing with this form of liability, the first ele-
ment that must be studied is the injury or harm suffered by the
victim. 93
According to Henao, in dealing with negligence liability,
there are many ways to look at liability. The key is in determin-
ing which element of liability one chooses to study first. Colom-
bian jurisprudence, particularly prior to the 1991 Constitution,
insisted that in order for civil liability to arise, one must show
that there was a breach. Concurrently, the injury had to be both
present and tied or linked to of causation. Today, Henao states,
the focus has shifted to the element of injury, because in some
cases, fault is not always an element or requirement for liability
to exist. As Dean Hinestrosa states in the prologue to Henao's
text:
[Tihe injury is the reason liability exists, and that is why, it is
imperative that it is explore in its distinct aspects and degree; for
it should occupy the first place in a logical and chronological
sense, in the minds of judges. If there is no injury, or it can't be
determined or evaluated, that should be the end; any further ef-
fort, relative to the act or actor or moral qualification of the con-
duct will be futile.94
Henao echoes this proposition by stating that the harm suf-
fered should be the first element to be discussed in the equation
91 See id.
92 See HENAO, supra note 64, at ch. 2.
93 See id.
94 See id.
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of civil liability. If a person has not been injured or harmed, he
should not be favored by a judgment that would unjustly enrich
him without cause. The injury is the cause for reparation, and
reparation or compensation is the finality of civil liability.
Henao criticizes judgments by the Colombian "Consejo de Es-
tado" which imposes its primary judgments based on a lack of
service or fault. For example, in a judgment dated October 2,
1996, the Consejo de Estado affirmed, "in an event of sub iudice
[lack of service], the injury does not have to be proven by the
person claiming the harm." According to Henao, this case rep-
resents the inadequacy of treating injury as a subsequent ele-
ment of civil liability. Notwithstanding the importance of first
determining the injury or harm suffered by the victim, it should
be noted that a showing of injury alone does not give rise to civil
liability.9 5
The person claiming the injury or harm must prove the in-
jury exists. As a starting point, Article 177 of the Code of Civil
Procedure affirms that "the legislator has established that it is
the duty of the parties to prove the claimed tortious act or con-
duct (hecho) of the norms that allow the judicial effect that they
seek." Therefore, it is not enough for the claimant to state that
she has suffered an injury; it must be proven in court. One ex-
ception to this rule applies when dealing with lost earnings
(lucro cesante) pertaining to an individual who has been injured
or has died. The judge will presume an injury when computing
lost earnings sought by those who are economically dependent
on that individual and have suffered an injury as a result of the
victim's injuries. The standard of proof to determine the value
of the lucro cesante is not the same standard required to prove
an injury was sustained. Nevertheless, this treatment of the
element of injury shows a departure from the American treat-
ment of negligence.
X. DAMAGES
In a personal injury complaint, it is customary for a plain-
tiff's attorney not to include a money amount for the total dam-
ages sought. Instead, the attorney will include generic
language in the complaint. This procedure regarding the ques-
95 Id.
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tions of damages leaves the judge ample discretion in the deter-
mination of damage awards. An example is illustrated in a case
where a minor suffered brain damage due to a gunshot, for
which he underwent several surgeries. The minor did not fully
recover from the injuries suffered. The Consejo de Estado or-
dered the defendant to pay the minor's health care bills for the
life of the minor together with any psychological treatment he
may need in the future. It is seen that the court may acknowl-
edge not only the damages that can be proved at the time of the
trial, but also the long term damaged that many not be assessa-
ble at the time of the trial.96
Another case pointed out by Henao is the case of a victim of
a negligent occurrence (hecho). He became 86% incapacitated
and remained in a paraplegic state. The normal equation for
damages in lost future earnings would have been based on the
aforementioned percentage. Notwithstanding, the Consejo de
Estado held that due to the high percentage of incapacity, the
percentage to be used in this case should be 100%. This, the
Estado noted, was justified by the necessity to cover the contin-
uous damage suffered by the injured and the assistance he will
need in living with the injuries sustained. 97
As stated above, Colombian law deals with the notion of
damages or indemnification, based on the proposition that the
injured should be put back in the position he was in prior to the
negligent act, or as closely to it as possible. Unlike the law of
most United States jurisdictions, under Colombian law, injured
parties in cases of personal injury arising out of non-contractual
liability do not include the recognition of punitive damages.
Henao states the unavailability of exemplary damages allows
for the injured to be made whole again without unjustly enrich-
ing the injured. While the two systems diverge on the question
of punitive damages, the civil code and common law approaches
alike are in agreement that the objective of such causes of ac-
tion is to permit the meritorious plaintiff to be returned, in how-
ever imperfect manner money damages can do so, to his or her
original condition. Indeed, it is fair to state that corrective jus-
tice is part of both Colombia and the United States equation for
negligence.
96 Id. at 84.
97 See id.
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Henao writes that the United States' treatment of punitive
damages has as its object to calm or comfort the injured for its
mental anguish, feelings, degradation, etc. He states that com-
pensatory damages are based upon the policy objective of pub-
licly punishing the tortfeasor. Should a losing defendant be
called upon to pay a substantial sum to the prevailing plaintiff,
Henao suggests, the defendant is made an example to others
who may be engaging in similar activities. In other words, com-
pensatory damages are used as a public deterrent.98 Although
punitive damages are not often used in the contemporary Co-
lombian approach to liability, the influential authors concur
that as technology continues to develop, the concept of exem-
plary damage awards will be incorporated into Colombian juris-
prudence, even if not expressly inserted into their Civil Code.
Furthermore, Henao argues that the application of the
aforementioned types of punitive damages do not exist "in the-
ory" in the continental system, which system's gravitational
pull can be recognized in much Colombian law. The Colombian
objective is to indemnify or compensate the injured for the harm
sustained. In contrast, by entertaining the potential of an
award of both compensatory damages and punitive damages,
the law of most United States jurisdictions is to provide com-
pensation for the wrongfully injured, and further, in instances
of extreme misconduct by the defendant, permit a quasi-crimi-
nal penalty that serves both to punish the defendant and to
make a public statement as to the unacceptability of such
behavior.
Under Colombian law, compensation for injuries sustained
must be made fully. Nevertheless, according to Henao, compen-
sation should be limited to the injury actually suffered and
proved. In the words of the Colombian Supreme Court "pay-
ment for damages must directly correspond with the magnitude
of the injury suffered, thus can not be any higher." The expla-
nation to this notion lies in the public belief that there should
not be unjust enrichment to the party injured. Again, Henao, in
the context of punitive damages, contrasts the United States'
public punishment of tortfeasors by the awarding of enormous
often bearing no discernible relationship to the harm actually
98 See HENAO, supra note 64, at 84.
29
PACE INT'L L. REV.
suffered. In his discussion of damages, and in relationship to
the concept of unjust enrichment, Henao also considers the is-
sue of subrogation under Colombian law. He analyzes the situ-
ation in which an injured individual receives compensation
from other sources. The compensation by other sources (other
than the tortfeasor) lowers the threshold of damages actually
suffered. In Colombia, the term used to describe this type of
situation is called compensatio lucri cum damno. This issue
arises when other parties contribute to the indemnification of
the damages. Examples of these forms of compensation are so-
cial security and private insurance policies. In the aforemen-
tioned situations, the injured can conceivably end up in a better
situation, in other words, unjust enrichment may occur as a re-
sult of the payment of damages by other and collateral sources.
According to Henao, the Consejo de Estado has stated that even
though unjust enrichment does not form part of the equation for
computing damages, there may be situations where this enrich-
ment may be legally justified. 99
Payments of employment insurance policies or social secur-
ity benefits legally belonging to the injured party or his family
does not prevent the injured from recovering damages from the
negligent party. Henao contrasts this view with that of France.
In France, these sources indeed limit the amount of recovery an
injured party may receive from the tortfeasor. One exception to
this rule occurs with respect to negligence insurance, where it
expressly calls for subrogation in accordance with Article 1096
of the Colombian Commerce Code. According to Henao, discrep-
ancies between supplemental indemnification and negligence
contracts arise as a result of the Colombian legislature's deci-
sion to differentiate the two. This leaves the courts powerless to
allow for supplemental compensation where there is an insur-
ance contract, which contains subrogation clauses.
There are different types of damages which entitle the in-
jured to compensation. The first type of damage is material. It
presupposes an economic loss. The second harm is moral in na-
ture, and does not contain an economic value. Colombian juris-
prudence has sustained that this distinction must be used to
guide the analysis of the types of damages in relationship to
99 See id.at ch. 3.
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their compensation. Notwithstanding, the types of damages as
outlined above can present confusion. It allows one to think
that all damage that does not have an economic or pecuniary
nature must be moral. Under Colombian law, the compensation
of "physical harm or in relation to life" was added only in 1993.
Henao argues that the better classification would be to say that
moral damages are a kind of non-pecuniary damage. In light of
the foregoing, the classification of damages should be done in
terms of economic versus non-economic.
10 0
In Colombian law, another distinction is made between
damages that are patrimonial versus non-patrimonial. Under
the economic damages are two sub-categories: the lucro cesante
and dafio emergente, both, which are patrimonial. Under the
non-patrimonial damages are included the moral injury and
physical injury. The judge decides both types. He has the dis-
cretion to decide the injury's classification and the amount of
compensation the injured will receive for each type of injury. As
to personal but non-physical injuries (dafios morales), Colom-
bian legal scholars refer to as moral injuries can be classified as
the equivalent of American damages for pain and suffering.
Economic damages are those that deal with personal prop-
erty or economic interests, which is to say, they are measurable
in terms of money. Colombian law, perhaps due to Articles
1613 and 1614 of the Civil Code, differentiate between lucro
cesante and dafio emergente. Article 1614 states that dafio
emergente arises out of "the damage or loss that arises of an
obligation that was not fulfilled, of erroneous fulfillment, or
tardy fulfillment." The dafio emergente encompasses the loss of
patrimonial property, the gains that this property would have
brought to the individual. Lucro cesante refers to the earnings
that stop from accruing due to the damage aforementioned.
These types of damages are applicable in both contractual and
non-contractual obligations. Henao distinguishes between the
two by stating that the dafio emergente produces a
"desembolso" an out of pocket damage, while the lucro cesante
produces a "no embolso" damage, meaning there is nothing be-
ing pocketed which would have been but for the injury or harm
sustained. The Mazeud brothers refer to lucro cesante as the
100 HENAO, supra note 64, at 191.
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"perdida sufrida" or loss suffered and "ganancia frustrada" or
frustrated earnings.1o1
A. El Daho Emergente
As previously stated this type of damage presents itself
when it is a physical injury suffered by the individual. Exam-
ples given by Henao representing dafto emergente are as fol-
lows: (1) The victim dies as a result of the injury. His family
must incur all expenses related to the victim's burial. Those
costs are an example of the dafios emergentes. (2) If the victim
survives, all the expenses incurred in the rehabilitation of the
victim are considered dafios emergentes. Daios emergentes
can also arise out of harm to one's belongings. When the injuri-
ous act affects belongings, the judge applies the same logic for
reparation of the damage as used in the damage to the physical
damage suffered by the individual.1o2
B. El Lucro Cesante
As stated by Henao, when the integrity of a person is at-
tacked there are effects that must be compensated. When an
individual dies as a result of the negligence of another, his fam-
ily is entitled to compensation for their out-of-pocket losses or
expenses (el dafio emergente) but also for the losses that will be
sustained by the family due to the injury or death of the family's
economic provider. Their loss in terms of monetary reparation
refers to the economic dependence family members may have
had on the decedent. When the dafho emergente is a damage
done to an object or thing, the Courts look to see the amount of
earnings lost as a result of the harm or damage.' 0 3
For a long time, the Supreme Court and the Consejo de Es-
tado sustained that non-patrimonial damages constituted only
moral damages. It was not until the 1990's that non-patrimo-
nial damages were broadened to include more than moral dam-
ages. In the case decided on February 14, 1992, the court
awarded a judgment of 1.800 grams of gold for moral damages.
This amount was higher then the traditional 1.000 gram courts
101 See id. at 197.
102 See id. at 210-14.
103 Id. at 223-224.
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had previously awarded. Despite the fact that the decision only
referred to the compensation of moral damages, it was inferred
that the judge was awarding damages that were outside the
scope of moral damages.
10 4
The definitive recognition of non-material damages took
place in the case decided on May 6, 1993. A year after the Con-
sejo de Estado amplified "physical damages" as a synonym of
"injury to the relationship of life," this case affirmed that "it is
necessary to recognize the award for physical damage or to the
damage to the relationship to life. This form of damage must be
distinguished from material damage, which encompasses both
dafio emergente and lucro cesante, and also must be distin-
guished from subjective moral damages." 10 5 Recognition of this
type of compensable harm remains an uphill fight. When, for
example, a boy suffers an injury that will leave him blind for
the rest of his life, or limited to a wheel chair, the amount and
logic of the award of damages for pain and suffering may be-
come enmeshed in the amount and rationale of the award of
material damages. Further employing the above hypothetical,
perhaps the blinded boy will require the aide of a guide dog.
Should a part of any monetary award be considered an award to
compensate for his physical injury, or is it more appropriately
considered an award for dafho emergente? Is it an award for
pain and suffering? Since 1998, there have been 35 cases where
the right to an "objective" award for pain and suffering has been
given.
XI. CONCLUSION
Non-contractual civil liability under Colombian law is cur-
rently struggling, as Colombian jurisprudence maintains
archaic notions of guilt and fault in determining civil liability.
As seen above, Colombian legal scholars are unable to identify
and clearly define the elements needed to achieve a unified no-
tion of non-contractual liability. This struggle has as one of its
components the influence of French law, which Colombia modi-
fied in an attempt suit the Colombian needs regarding the
structure of civil liability. Another component is exemplified by
104 See TAMAYO JARAMILLO, supra note 64.
105 Id. at 265 (trans. from Spanish).
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the need to modernize the terms and the usage of liability to
fully compensate victims. Due to the fear of unjust enrichment,
often-Colombian victims are left without the due compensation
for the injuries they suffer.
A struggle for legality and compensation are reflected in
the texts used in my effort to better understand the legal con-
cept of non-contractual liability in Colombia. They are ex-
tremely unclear, filled with thesis's containing no concrete
answers. The authors' conceptualization of this current vague-
ness is tempered by the understanding that the concept of non-
contractual liability in Colombia is at best at its early stages of
development. As stated by Henao, it was not until the 1990's
that the courts fully accepted the concept of pain and suffering
awards, and today, many cases contain awards that are not eas-
ily differentiated.
Colombian negligence law emerged from the Napoleonic
Code, which it modified to comport with the Chilean Civil Code
written by Andres Bello.10 6 By leaving out the words "under its
care" the Colombian Civil Code created negligence laws that
used criminal law principles to attain a desired result - a non-
contractual liability tort system. This gave rise to the past and
continued disagreement and confusion among its scholars who
try to define Colombian negligence laws. Notwithstanding,
along the way both American and Colombian laws are seeking
to create a balance between the interest of the injured party and
society's interest in what might be termed robust personal and
commercial autonomy. On one hand, Colombian lawyers strug-
gle to capture the flag of punitive damages for their clients. On
the other hand, American trial lawyers lobby against business
efforts to moderate or eliminate such awards. When and where
will they meet?
106 See id. at 2.
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